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Cryptography’s importance in our everyday lives continues to grow in our increasingly digital
world. Oblivious transfer (OT) has long been a fundamental and important cryptographic primitive
since it is known that general two-party cryptographic tasks can be built from this basic building
block. Here we show the experimental implementation of a 1-2 random oblivious transfer (ROT) pro-
tocol by performing measurements on polarization-entangled photon pairs in a modified entangled
quantum key distribution system, followed by all of the necessary classical post-processing including
one-way error correction. We successfully exchange a 1,366 bits ROT string in ∼3 min and include
a full security analysis under the noisy storage model, accounting for all experimental error rates
and finite size effects. This demonstrates the feasibility of using today’s quantum technologies to
implement secure two-party protocols.
Cryptography, prior to the modern computing age,
was synonymous with the protection of private com-
munications using a variety of encryption techniques,
such as a wax seal or substitution cypher. However,
with the advent of modern digital computing and an in-
creasingly internet-driven society, important new cryp-
tographic challenges have arisen. People now wish to do
business and interact with others they neither know nor
trust. In the field of cryptography this is known as secure
two-party computation. Here we have two users, Alice
and Bob, who wish to perform a computation on their
private inputs in such a way that they obtain the correct
output but without revealing any additional information
about their inputs.
A particularly important and familiar example is the
task of secure identification, which we perform any time
we use a bank’s ATM to withdraw money. Here hon-
est Alice (the bank) and honest Bob (the legitimate cus-
tomer) share a password. When authenticating a new
session, Alice checks to make sure she is really interact-
ing with Bob by validating his password before dispens-
ing any money. However, we do not want Bob to sim-
ply announce his password since a malicious Alice could
steal his password and impersonate him in the future.
What we require is a method for checking whether Bob’s
password is valid without revealing any additional infor-
mation. While protocols for general two-party crypto-
graphic tasks such as this one may be very involved, it is
known that they can be built from a basic cryptographic
building block called oblivious transfer (OT) [1].
Many classical cryptography techniques currently in
use have their security based on conjectured mathemati-
cal assumptions such as the hardness of finding the prime
factors of a large number, assumptions which no longer
hold once a sufficiently large quantum computer is built
[2]. Alternatively, quantum cryptography offers means
to accomplish cryptographic tasks which are provably se-
cure using fewer assumptions that are ideally much more
stringent than those employed classically. However, until
now almost all of the experimental work has focused ex-
clusively on quantum key distribution, yet there are many
other cryptographic primitives [3–6] which can make use
of quantum mechanics to augment their security. OT is
a prime example.
While it has been shown that almost no cryptographic
two-party primitives, save for QKD, are secure if a quan-
tum channel is available and no further restrictions are
placed on an adversary [7–9], two-party protocols are so
pivotal to modern cryptography that we are required to
explore scenarios that place realistic restrictions on an
adversary which allow provable security to be restored in
important real world settings. Moreover, if we can effi-
ciently implement low-cost quantum cryptography while
making it much harder and more expensive for adver-
saries to break it as compared to classical schemes, even
if not provably secure without added assumptions, then
we have still provided a benefit.
One can regain provable security for OT within the
noisy-storage model [10, 11] under the physical assump-
tion that an adversary does not possess a large reliable
quantum memory. This model most accurately captures
the difficulty facing a potential adversary since most
quantum memories currently suffer from one or more of
the following problems: either the transfer of the pho-
tonic qubit into the physical system used for the memory
is noisy; or the memory is unable to sufficiently maintain
the integrity of the quantum information over time; or
the memory suffers from an inability to perform consis-
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2tently (ie. photons are often lost causing the memory to
act as an erasure channel).
With current technology, the quantum information
stored in a quantum memory is lost within a few mil-
liseconds [12–14]. While there have been recent demon-
strations of systems with coherence times on the order
of seconds and even minutes [15, 16], high fidelity trans-
fer of quantum information from another physical system
into the memory system and its subsequent storage have
not yet been demonstrated. Further, a reliable memory
also requires fault tolerant error correction built into its
architecture. Until these significant experimental chal-
lenges are met, security is assured under the noisy stor-
age model. Even with the advent of practical quantum
storage, for any storage size with a finite upper bound,
security can still be achieved by simply increasing the
number of qubits exchanged during the protocol. More-
over, the currently executed protocol holds secure even if
a dishonest party obtains a better quantum memory in
the future.
Because of its huge potential, securing OT with quan-
tum means has recently received interest both from this
experiment, as well as the recent 1-out-of-N OT exper-
iment performed by Chan et al. [17]. We note how-
ever that, in contrast to our implementation, Chan et
al. achieves only a weak version of 1-out-of-N OT in
which the attacker gains a significant amount of infor-
mation. Additionally, continued theoretical work [11]
has been used to propose a number of different exper-
imentally feasible protocols that could be implemented
using today’s technology [18, 19]. Notably, quantum bit
commitment secure under the noisy storage model was
recently shown by Ng et al. [20]. And while it is in-
deed known that oblivious transfer can in principle be
built from secure bit commitment and additional quan-
tum communication [21], the protocol for such a reduc-
tion is inefficient and has not been analyzed in a setting
where errors are present.
In this work, we show the first experimental imple-
mentation of OT secured under the noisy-storage model
using a modified entangled quantum key distribution sys-
tem and all of the necessary classical post-processing
algorithms including one-way error correction. During
a ∼3 min quantum and classical exchange we generate
1,366 bits of secure ROT key accounting for all exper-
imental error rates and finite size effects. Using a new
min-entropy uncertainty relation to derive much higher
OT rates we examine a number of trade-offs and ana-
lyze the secure parameter regimes. This demonstrates
the feasibility of using today’s quantum technologies to
implement secure two-party protocols, most notably the
building block necessary to construct a secure identifica-
tion scheme [22] to securely authenticate oneself at an
ATM one day.
RESULTS
The Oblivious Transfer Protocol
In a 1-2 OT protocol we have two parties, Alice and
Bob. Alice holds two secret binary strings Sˆ0, Sˆ1 ∈ {0, 1}l
of length l. Bob wishes to learn one of these two strings,
and the string he decides to learn is given by his choice
bit C ∈ {0, 1}. The protocol is called oblivious trans-
fer because of its security conditions: if Alice is honest,
then in learning the string of his choice, SˆC , Bob should
learn nothing about Alice’s other string, Sˆ1−C ; while if
Bob is honest, Alice should not be able to discern which
string Bob chose to learn, i.e. Alice should not learn C.
Security is not required in the case where both parties
are dishonest. The 1-2 refers to the fact that Bob learns
one and only one of Alice’s two secret strings.
In order to implement 1-2 OT we actually first im-
plement 1-2 random oblivious transfer (ROT) which is
then converted into 1-2 OT with an additional step at
the end. In the randomized protocol, rather than Alice
choosing her two strings she instead receives the two se-
cret binary strings S0, S1 ∈ {0, 1}l, chosen uniformly at
random, as an output of the protocol. After the ROT
protocol is complete, Alice can use these random strings
as one-time pads to encrypt her original desired inputs
Sˆ0 and Sˆ1 and send them both to Bob. Bob can then
recover Alice’s original intended string by using the SC
he learned during the ROT protocol in order to decrypt
his desired SˆC thus completing a 1-2 OT protocol.
For the protocol to hold correct when both parties are
honest, it is crucial that Alice and Bob have devices sat-
isfying a minimum set of requirements, for example the
loss and error rates have to be upper bounded. In the
correctness proof, Alice and Bob’s devices are assumed
not to exceed a maximum loss and error rate. It is these
upper bounded values that will be used in the secure
ROT string formula (Eq. 8) in order to determine the
maximum allowable size for the generated ROT string.
Whenever their devices fulfill these criteria, the protocol
can be executed correctly. On the contrary, in the secu-
rity proof, a dishonest party is assumed to be all powerful:
in particular he/she can use perfect devices to eliminate
losses and errors in order to use them as a cheating ad-
vantage instead. The only restriction on a cheating party
in this model is that of the quantum memory accessible.
We refer the reader to the formal security definition of
this protocol in [19].
Fig. 1 outlines our 1-2 ROT protocol [18, 19]. A
source of polarization-entangled photon pairs distributes
one photon from each pair to Alice and Bob. In fact, Al-
ice holds the entanglement source as it has been shown
that this does not affect either correctness or security.
Alice and Bob measure in one of the two usual BB84
bases, H/V (+) or +45◦/−45◦ (×), using passive polar-
3ization detectors. For every photon they detect, they
record their measurement basis as αi and βj , their bit
value as Xi and Yj , and their measurement time as tAi
and tBj respectively. Bob then sends his timing infor-
mation to Alice so that she can perform a coincidence
search allowing them to sift down to those measurement
results where they both detected a photon from a pair.
Alice then checks that the number of photons Bob de-
tected falls within the secure interval allowing them to
proceed. At this point Alice obtains basis and bit strings
αm and Xm, while Bob obtains basis and bit strings βm
and Y m, all of which are of length m.
Both parties now wait a time, ∆t, long enough for any
stored quantum information of a dishonest party to de-
cohere. Note that the information Bob sends to Alice
after this point does not provide her information about
his choice bit SC , provided that Bob’s choice of basis
is completely uniform. To ensure the uniformity of this
choice, an honest Bob can perform symmetrization over
all his detectors to make them all equally efficient [20],
so that Alice cannot make a better guess of his choice
bit than a random guess. Hence, it is really only Al-
ice who is waiting here to protect against a dishonest
Bob who might have been storing some of his photons.
Once the secure wait time is observed, Alice sends Bob
her basis information, αm. This allows Bob to divide his
bits into two subsets: Y |IC , where his measurement ba-
sis matched Alice’s (αi = βi) leading eventually to the
shared bit string SC ; and Y |I1−C , where his measure-
ment basis did not match Alice’s (αi 6= βi), which leads
to the second bit string S1−C which Bob should know
nothing about.
Next, Bob sends his index lists, I0 and I1, to Alice so
that she can partition her data identically. Note that it
is Bob’s choice of labelling the subset where his measure-
ment bases matched Alice’s as IC which allows him to
eventually learn his desired SC from Alice since this is
the subset in which error correction will succeed. How-
ever, this does not reveal C to Alice since from her point
of view she always receives an I0 and I1 from Bob and
there is never any information in the partitioning which
would allow her to deduce C.
Continuing, Alice performs one-way error correction
by encoding syndrome information for each of her two
subsets, syn(X|I0) and syn(X|I1), which she then sends
to Bob. Bob is able to use the syndrome information for
the subset where his measurement bases matched Alice’s,
Y |IC , to correct any errors in his string to obtain his er-
ror corrected string ycor. Note that Bob will only be able
to correct his string if the devices and quantum channel
are operating within their design parameters since this
is what the one-way error correction code has been op-
timized for. If Bob is dishonest, then we do not need
to worry about him being able to decode, the goal of
the protocol is to ensure that honest Bob can learn his
desired string.
The last step is to perform privacy amplification
[23, 24], which is a cryptographic technique that allows
a situation of partial ignorance to be turned into a sit-
uation of (essentially) complete ignorance. For exam-
ple, suppose Alice has a long string (here X|I1−C) which
is difficult, but not impossible, for Bob to guess. That
is, Bob’s min-entropy about the string X|I1−C is large.
Applying a randomly chosen two-universal hash function
f1−C to X|I1−C allows Alice to obtain a (typically much
shorter) string S1−C = f1−C(X|I1−C) which is essen-
tially impossible for Bob to guess. That is, if the length
of the short string is 2l, then Bob’s guessing probability
is very close to 1/2l which means that Bob has learned
nothing about the short string. The only cost to Alice for
performing this is to reduce the size of her output strings
somewhat according to Eq. 8.
To perform privacy amplification, Alice and Bob use
the secure ROT string rate formula (Eq. 8) and the
estimates of the error rate and loss due to their de-
vices and the quantum channel to calculate the length
of extractable ROT string which they can keep after
privacy amplification. Alice applies the two-universal
hash functions f0 and f1 to her two substrings X|I0
and X|I1 and obtains the shorter strings S0 = f0(X|I0)
and S1 = f1(X|I1) as her private outputs, while Bob
applies the appropriate two-universal hash function to
his subset ycor obtaining his desired SC = fC(ycor) as
his private output. Privacy amplification is extremely
important since Bob has potentially gained a significant
amount of information about Alice’s second string, which
a secure protocol requires he know nothing about. This
extra information has come from the syndrome informa-
tion Alice sent for her second subset, syn(X|I1−C), where
their measurement bases did not match and from Bob’s
ability to store partial quantum information and attempt
to cheat. In our proof, we show that X|I1−C has a high
min-entropy and hence the output S1−C is close to uni-
form after privacy amplification. Of course, dishonest
Bob could use the error correction information to cor-
rect errors in his own storage device or he could open his
device, remove all its imperfections, and then perform a
partial attack to gain extra information without raising
the error rate above the allowed limit. Regardless, by
subtracting the entire length of the error correction in-
formation from the initial extractable ROT string Alice
can extract a shorter string S1−C via privacy amplifica-
tion, which looks uniform to Bob, ensuring the security
of the protocol.
As the above protocol has just summarized, even
though breaking the security of our protocol requires a
large quantum memory with long storage times, neither
quantum memory nor the ability to perform quantum
computations are needed to actually run the protocol.
Thus, as we shall see below, the technological require-
ments for honest parties are comparable to QKD and
hence well within reach of current technology.
4FIG. 1. Flow chart of the 1-2 ROT protocol.
Experimental Parameters
It is important to realize that the techniques used here
to prove the security of ROT are fundamentally different
than those used in proving the security of QKD. Con-
trary to QKD, there is no real-time parameter estimation
which needs to be performed. Instead, the two parties es-
timate the parameters before performing the OT proto-
col. The only requirement is that it should be possible for
honest parties to bring certain hardware to execute the
protocol. Dishonest parties can have arbitrary devices
and still security will be assured based on the following:
1. Alice holds the source and can completely charac-
terize it. Thus, if Alice is honest she can rely on
the source following the estimated parameters. If
she is dishonest, she is allowed to replace the source
with an arbitrary quantum device (it could be a full
quantum computer with arbitrary storage since the
storage assumption is only needed to deal with a
dishonest Bob).
2. Honest Bob can always test his device himself with-
out relying on Alice.
3. The channel parameters (ie. the loss and error rate)
can be estimated jointly by Alice and Bob. De-
pending on their estimate, Alice decides how much
error correction information she needs to send. If
Bob was dishonest and lied during the estimate
then one of the following scenarios happens (both
of which are secure):
(a) Alice finds there is no n such that secure OT
can be performed in which case she either de-
mands Bob get a better device or for the two
of them to invest in a better channel.
(b) Alice tunes n such that security can be ob-
tained for their estimated parameters. Dis-
honest Bob could have lied and later elim-
inated his losses and errors for the OT ex-
change; however, this is already accounted
for in the security analysis which assumes
a dishonest Bob can have a perfect channel
and perfect devices (his only limitation is the
memory bound).
54. If the parameters turn out to be different for the
honest parties during the protocol (e.g. the errors
turn out to be much higher) compared to what was
estimated earlier, then the protocol may not suc-
ceed. Hence, once the parameters are estimated
and fixed, then the honest parties need to use hard-
ware satisfying these parameters if they want to
perform the protocol correctly. However, security
is not affected by the actual amount of losses and
errors.
To evaluate security we model our parametric down-
conversion (PDC) entangled photon source in the stan-
dard way [25] by measuring the mean photon pair number
per pulse (µ) which is directly related to the amplitude
of the pump laser. Since it is a continuously pumped
source we define our pulse length as the coherence time
of our laser. Three other measured parameters are also
required: the total transmission efficiency or transmit-
tance, η, the intrinsic detection error rate of the system,
edet, and the probability of a dark count in one of Alice’s
or Bob’s detectors, pdark. The detection error is the prob-
ability that a photon sent by the source causes a click in
the wrong detector, which can happen due to deficiencies
or misalignments in Alice and Bob’s equipment or due to
processes in the quantum channel. For the dark count
probability Alice and Bob take the value of their worst
detector. Note that the parameters measured are neces-
sary for allowing correctness of the protocol between two
honest parties. In light of this, Alice and Bob perform
a device and channel characterization and use these es-
timates in all subsequent security checks of the system.
In the security analysis, a malicious party is assumed to
have full power over their devices, such as eliminating
all losses and noise in the communication while tricking
the honest party to believe otherwise. Their values are
summarized in the top of Table I.
With these definitions we compute a number of proba-
bilities needed for the security statements, which are con-
ditioned on the event that Alice observed a single click,
namely: p1sent the probability that exactly one entangled
photon pair is emitted from the source (all double pair
emissions are assumed to give an adversary full informa-
tion), phB,noclick the probability an honest Bob did not de-
tect a photon, and pdB,noclick the probability that a dishon-
est Bob did not detect a photon. Note that pdB,noclick 6= 0
due to dark counts in Alice’s detectors. Thus, even if a
dishonest Bob removes all loss in the quantum channel
and uses perfect detectors, there will still be pairs reg-
istered by Alice (she cannot differentiate between dark
counts and valid detections of photons from entangled
pairs) which a dishonest Bob misses. These probabilities
are derived from our PDC model following Refs. [18, 19]
using the parameters given in Table I (more details can
be found in the “Methods: Experimental Security Pa-
rameters” section).
Experimental Parameters Value
µ (3.145± 0.016)× 10−5
η 0.0150± 0.0001
edet 0.0093± 0.0002
pdark (1.50± 0.04)× 10−8
n (8.00± 0.06)× 107
Adversary’s Memory Limitations Value
d 2
r 0.75
ν 0.002
Security Parameters Value
ε 2.5× 10−7
εEC 3.09× 10−3
f 1.491
TABLE I. Experimental parameters. µ is the mean photon
pair number per coherence time, η is the total transmittance,
edet is the intrinsic error rate of the system, and pdark is the
probability of obtaining a dark count per coherence time; d is
the dimension of the assumed depolarizing channel (a qubit
channel is assumed), r is the probability that the memory (as-
sumed to be a depolarizing channel) retains the state, and ν is
the storage rate of the quantum memory (ν = 0 means that no
qubits can be stored, while ν = 1 means all transmitted qubits
can be stored); ε is an error parameter used throughout the
analysis, εEC is the error correction failure parameter, f is the
error correction efficiency, and n is the total number (before
losses) of entangled photon pairs exchanged. The correctness
error for the protocol will be 2ε+ εEC and the security error
will be 3ε. The source is pumped with 7 mW of power, and
Poissonian error bars and Gaussian error propagation have
been used where appropriate.
Correctness
Whenever Alice and Bob are both honest, we desire
that the protocol runs correctly even in the presence
of experimental imperfections except with some failure
probability. To quantify this probability, Alice and Bob
can beforehand agree on some correctness error, ε > 0,
which will be used to lower bound the failure probability
of this protocol. This parameter can also be seen as a
bound on the maximum allowable fluctuations observed
during the protocol allowing one to form acceptable in-
tervals around the expected values for p1sent, p
h
B,noclick,
and pdB,noclick wherein correctness will hold. For ex-
ample, the acceptable interval for pB,noclick is given by
[(1− phB,noclick − ζ)n, (1− phB,noclick + ζ)n] with
ζ =
√
ln 1ε
2n
(1)
given by invoking Hoeffding’s inequality [26]. Accord-
ing to Hoeffding’s inequality, the number of detected
6rounds fall out of this interval with probability less than
2ε. For our experiment, we chose a correctness error of
ε = 2.5× 10−7. Note that in our analysis there is a cor-
rectness error and a security error (discussed in the next
section) which we represent by the same variable, ε, since
they take the same value, but they could in general be
different.
During the protocol Alice checks whether the number
of rounds reported as lost by Bob lies outside the in-
terval that would be expected based on the parameters
estimated before starting the protocol. We emphasize
that this test is not part of the parameter estimation,
but rather ensures that the absolute number of rounds
reported lost by Bob is limited. Intuitively, this is a crit-
ical step since it prevents a dishonest Bob, who has a
perfect channel, from using the fact that he can report
rounds as lost to discard some or all of the single pho-
ton rounds (for which he only potentially gains partial
information) in favour of multi-photon rounds (where he
gains full information). Thus, the step prevents a dis-
honest Bob from performing the equivalent of the well-
known photon-number-splitting attack from QKD [27] in
our protocol. For more details, please refer to Ref. [18,
Sec. III].
Error correction is also necessary in order to correct er-
rors due to the quantum channel, so that Bob can faith-
fully recover SC . Error correction must be done with
a one-way forward error correction protocol to maintain
the security of the protocol. The error-correcting code is
chosen such that Bob can decode faithfully except with
a probability at most εEC. Thus, our ROT protocol will
succeed except with probability 2ε + εEC. For our error
correction code, we have found an (empirically tested)
upper bound to the error correction failure probability of
εEC ≤ 3.09 × 10−3. Thus, the total correctness error is
upper bounded by 2ε + εEC ≈ 0.0031. Note that while
the decoding error has a large effect on the total correct-
ness error of the protocol, it does not affect the security
error of the protocol. In particular, the security error can
be much lower than the correctness error, which we will
see in the next section.
Security
In this section, we show that the security error can
be made small, i.e. the protocol holds secure against
dishonest parties except with error 3ε = 7.5×10−7. Note
that in our analysis we first fix the security error, ε, and
then derive the corresponding rate of OT. Thus, just like
in QKD, one can reduce ε at the expense of shortening
the final OT string if a particular situation calls for a
smaller security error.
To evaluate security for honest Alice, we need to prove
that Bob does not know at least one of the extracted
strings. This is done by quantifying Bob’s knowledge
about the string Xm that Alice has. The min-entropy
serves as a suitable quantification in such cases, and is
defined as
Hmin(X|Bob) := − log pguess(X|Bob) (2)
where pguess(X|Bob) is the probability of Bob guessing
X correctly, maximized over all possible measurements
he can perform on his system. The min-entropy can
also be understood operationally as the number of bits
extractable from X, which appear random to Bob [28].
To allow for imperfect states we use the smoothed min-
entropy Hmin(X|Bob) which is the min-entropy maxi-
mized over all joint states of ρ˜X,Bob close (in terms of pu-
rified distance) to the original state ρX,Bob, where ρX,Bob
is the joint state of Alice’s variable X and Bob’s entire
system.
Note that a dishonest Bob’s strategy, upon receiving
information from Alice, can in general be as follows:
he performs some arbitrary encoding upon the received
state, and stores the state into some quantum mem-
ory (possibly retaining some additional classical informa-
tion). After receiving Alice’s basis information, he uti-
lizes the stored qubits to perform strategic measurements
again, gaining more classical information from his mea-
surement outcome. Therefore, the main goal is to show
that given all of Bob’s information his guessing proba-
bility of Xm is still low, i.e. Bob’s min-entropy is lower
bounded.
To do so, we employ the min-entropy uncertainty rela-
tion recently derived by Ng et al. [29], given by
H
ε/2
min(X
m|αmK) ≥ m1 · cBB84 (3)
where αm is the vector of measurement bases of an honest
Alice, K represents some arbitrary classical side informa-
tion, while cBB84 is a constant that depends solely on the
measurements and arises due to bounding a family of
Re´nyi entropies. The quantity m1 = (p1sent − phB,noclick +
pdB,noclick − 3ζ)n ≈ 1.049× 106 is a lower bound (includ-
ing finite size effects) for the number of single photon pair
rounds exchanged [18], except with probability ε. We use
this to bound the minimum amount of uncertainty Bob
has about Alice’s overall string Xm. The value of cBB84
is given by
cBB84 = max
s∈(0,1]
1
s
[1 + s− log2(1 + 2s)]−
1
s ·m1 log2
( 8
ε2
)
.
(4)
The bound on the min-entropy in Eq. 3 also implies
that, for security to hold at all we require
p1sent − phB,noclick + pdB,noclick − 3ζ > 0 (5)
to generate a positive m1 and by extension a positive
min-entropy. This condition provides the regime of pa-
rameters, specifically with respect to µ and η, wherein
secure ROT can be performed.
7Subsequently, we further bound Bob’s min-entropy
conditioned on his quantum memory. ROT has been
proven secure against adversaries whose memories sat-
isfy the strong-converse property. This states that the
success probability of decoding a randomly chosen n-bit
string sent through the quantum memory decays expo-
nentially for rates above the classical memory capacity.
Recent theoretical results also show that this can be re-
fined by linking security to the entanglement cost [30] and
quantum capacity [31] of the memory, instead of the clas-
sical capacity. To explicitly evaluate security, we follow
Refs. [18, 19] and model the memory as a d-dimensional
depolarizing channel, given by
Nr(ρ) = rρ+ (1− r)1
d
for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 (6)
which successfully transmits the state ρ with probability
r and otherwise replaces it with the completely mixed
state 1d with probability 1− r, as the typical action of a
quantum memory specializing to the case of qubits (ie.
d = 2). A memory has one other pertinent parameter
we need; namely, a storage rate, ν, which represents the
fraction of qubits which an adversarial Bob can store in
memory. Intuitively, the noise (1 − r) and storage rate
(ν) are related since increasing the amount of quantum
error correction in the memory would decrease the noise
at the cost of using more memory qubits for error correc-
tion thus decreasing the storage rate. However, for this
analysis we leave them as two independent parameters.
The choices for r and ν in the middle of Table I are made
for an assumed future quantum storage device subjected
to depolarizing noise that retains the state with proba-
bility r = 0.75. The storage rate ν = 0.002 implies we
assume that a dishonest party cannot store more than
νn ≈ 1.600 × 105 of all the n = 8.00 × 107 qubits. Note
that our experiment is quite secure as all current mem-
ories decohere after ∼1 sec and can only store a handful
of photons.
There is a second condition necessary for security to
hold given by
CN · νn < cBB84 ·m1
2
− 1− log2
(2
ε
)
(7)
where CN is the classical capacity of the memory (N ).
This implies that the classical capacity of the total quan-
tum memory (assumed to satisfy the strong converse
property) should be strictly less than the total min-
entropy of Bob’s knowledge of Xm, including some finite
size effects.
Finally, we can explore the ROT rate formula [19, 29]
which tells Alice and Bob how many secure ROT bits
they can keep from the privacy amplification operation.
It is given by
l ≤ 1
2
ν · γN
(
R
ν
)
· n− f · h(perr)m
2
− log2
(
2
ε
)
(8)
where γN is the strong converse parameter of an adver-
sary’s memory (N ) which essentially gives the classical
memory capacity, R = 1n (cBB84 · m1/2 − 1 − log2(2/ε))
is the rate at which a dishonest Bob would need to store
quantum information, m = (1−phB,noclick)n ≈ 1.128×106
is the number of rounds where Alice and Bob both mea-
sured a photon from the pair, f is the error correction
efficiency relative to the Shannon limit, and perr is the
total probability of an error between Alice’s and Bob’s
subset where their basis choices matched (including dark
counts, their intrinsic detector error (edet), and any er-
rors induced by the quantum channel). It is instructive
to think of the three terms in Eq. 8 in the following way.
The first term represents the amount of uncertainty Bob
has over at least one of Alice’s strings, regardless of the
classical/quantum information he has. This is also the
maximum ROT string that could be produced. From
this one has to subtract the second term representing
the information potentially leaked to an adversarial party
during error correction, just as one would in QKD. This
quantity is exactly the length of the error correction syn-
drome information which (as mentioned earlier) we must
subtract from Bob’s initial min-entropy to ensure security
holds. Finally, the third term represents a safety margin
guaranteeing the maximum security failure probability.
We conclude, that security holds for an honest Alice
except with probability 3ε = 7.5× 10−7, where the error
comes from the finite size effects due to the number of
single photon rounds, from smoothing of the min-entropy,
and the error of privacy amplification. Note that the
preceding security discussion used a simplified detector
model and neglected vulnerabilities from a number of well
known attacks in QKD [32–36] most of which target the
detectors used.
Analysis of Secure Parameter Regimes
The ROT rate is sensitive to four parameters: the de-
polarizing noise, r; the storage rate, ν; the intrinsic er-
ror rate of the system, edet; and the transmittance, η.
Further, the secure range of each of these individual pa-
rameters depends on the values of the others, though
we emphasize that the sensitivity is due in part to the
fact that we tried to obtain the maximum length of OT
string compatible with our n, ε, and storage assumptions.
Similarly to QKD, one could make security less sensitive
by being less demanding about the output length of the
OT string. Nonetheless, we examine here the two most
important parameters which determined the final ROT
string length; namely, the transmittance and the error
rate.
Fig. 2 (left) shows the ROT rate versus the transmit-
tance for error rates of 0.93% (red - this experiment),
1.75% (green), and 2.3% (blue) from which we can see
why loss is so crucial to the security of ROT. The secure
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FIG. 2. Plot of the ROT rate, l, versus (left) the transmittance, η, for the edet values of 0.0093 (red - this experiment), 0.0175
(green), and 0.023 (blue); and (right) the error rate, edet, for the η values of 0.015 (red - this experiment), 0.1 (green), and
0.25 (blue). A magenta point is shown on the left graph representing the efficiency we experienced and the corresponding ROT
string rate and on the right graph representing our error rate and the corresponding ROT string rate. Error bars are smaller
than the data points.
ROT rate quickly drops as the transmittance decreases;
indeed, for higher error rate values the ROT rate can
quickly become negative even for relatively large trans-
mittances, e.g. η ∼ 0.15. Already with our table top ex-
periment we experienced a total transmission efficiency
of 1.5%, which just allowed us to get a positive ROT
string length. Our transmittance and the corresponding
ROT rate are shown by the magenta point on the far left
of this graph. The situation only gets worse when one
thinks about using the scheme in a distributed quantum
network where loss will be even higher.
Just as importantly, Fig. 2 (right) shows the ROT
rate versus the detection error, edet, for transmittances
of η = 0.015 (red - this experiment), η = 0.1 (green),
and η = 0.25 (blue). From our system’s transmittance
of η = 0.015 we can see that in order to get a posi-
tive ROT rate we needed to observe an error rate of less
than 0.954% over the course of the experiment. Fortu-
nately for this experiment, we managed to decrease the
error rate to 0.93%. Our error rate and the correspond-
ing ROT rate are shown by the magenta point on this
graph. While the constraint on the maximum allowable
error rate does relax somewhat as the transmittance of
the system increases, it never gets above a tolerable er-
ror rate of 2.38% even at transmittances as high as 25%.
This represents an extremely experimentally challenging
constraint, one that is much stronger than the typical
safe QBER levels for QKD (∼ 11%). This fact alone pre-
vents most of the existing QKD systems in the world from
being easily converted into a secure ROT implementa-
tion through a classical post-processing software update
alone. Each of these two constraints can be individually
relaxed at the cost of more stringent conditions on the
other. However, our hope is that future theoretical work
on the security of ROT in the noisy storage model can
improve these bounds.
Experiment
Before starting the experiment, all the pertinent pa-
rameters are estimated/selected and shown in Table I in
order for Alice and Bob to evaluate the length of the
ROT strings, given by Eq. 8, which they could subse-
quently extract from their data. Over the course of∼50 s,
Alice and Bob measured 1,347,412 coincident detection
events. With the photon pairs distributed Alice veri-
fied that the number of Bob’s reported measurements fell
within the secure interval. After waiting for a minimum
time ∆t = 1 s for any stored quantum information of a
dishonest party to decohere, Alice sent her basis measure-
ment information (α) to Bob. Using his choice bit, C = 0,
Bob partitioned his data into Y |IC=0 where his measure-
ment basis matched Alice’s (ie. αi = βi), and Y |I1−C=1
where his measurement basis did not match Alice’s (ie.
αi 6= βi), truncating both subsets to 600,000 bits (the
block size needed for the error correction algorithm). He
then sent his partitioning, I0 and I1, to Alice.
Alice partitioned her data accordingly, encoded the
syndrome information for each subset, and sent it to Bob.
With the system operating within the design parameter
requirements, Bob was successfully able to error correct
his subset of data, Y |IC=0, where his measurement basis
matched Alice’s in 2 min 14 sec. Using the the estimate
of the error rate in Eq. 8, Alice and Bob calculated the
size of their secure final ROT string to be 1,366 bits. To
complete the protocol, Alice then chose two 2-universal
hash functions [24], f0, f1 ∈ F , sent her choices to Bob,
and calculated her private outputs S0 = f0(x|I0) and
S1 = f1(x|I1) retaining the last 1,366 bits from the 2-
universal hash operation in each case. Having chosen
C = 0, Bob used f0 to compute SC = fC(ycor) as his
private output, obtaining the ROT string S0 he desired
from Alice.
9Lastly, if Alice and Bob had wanted to remove the ran-
domness from the protocol to implement OT with specific
strings desired by Alice, she could have used S0 and S1 as
one-time pads to encrypt her desired strings and sent the
results to Bob. Using his S0 he could then have decrypted
Alice’s last communication, recovering his desired string
from Alice.
DISCUSSION
It is important to notice that ROT is a fundamen-
tally different cryptographic primitive than QKD and
represents an important new tool at our disposal. Using
the example of securing one’s banking information at an
ATM, it has long been suggested to use a small handheld
QKD device to accomplish this [37]. However, if one were
to employ ROT to build a secure identification scheme,
as opposed to QKD, one’s bank card number and PIN
would never physically be exchanged over any communi-
cation line. Rather, the ATM and the user would merely
be evaluating the joint equality function, f(x) = f(y), on
each of their copies of the login information. This starkly
illustrates the difference between ROT and QKD, as well
as highlights ROT’s potential in certain situations.
The use of the new min-entropy relation [29] was cru-
cial to making our experimental implementation practical
since it could be applied to much smaller block lengths
while taking into account finite size effects. To put it
in perspective, estimates using the original analysis from
Ref. [19] suggested we required n on the order of 109
- 1010 bits requiring Alice and Bob to measure photon
pairs for over 4 hrs. Any real-world secure identifica-
tion protocol, such as at an ATM, making use of such
an ROT implementation would obviously be entirely im-
practical. However, by employing the new min-entropy
uncertainty relation we were able to generate positive OT
lengths with an n as low as 6.65× 104. In fact, the lim-
iting factor in our protocol became the minimum block
size necessary for our one-way error correction code to
succeed with high probability at the required efficiency.
Though the current work is secure for memories which
follow the strong converse property, many important
channels exhibit this property; for instance, the depo-
larizing channel assumed for this work. Moreover, while
a few quantum memories have already been shown to
work with high fidelity, they are all post-selected results.
In other words, many photons are lost during their op-
eration causing them to act as erasure channels. An ad-
versary using one of these memories would find its ac-
tion looking very close to a depolarizing channel since
the best they could do is replace any lost photons with a
random state. Moreover, recent theoretical results have
shown this argument can be refined by linking the suc-
cess probability of decoding to the entanglement cost [30]
and quantum capacity [31] of the memory, instead of the
classical capacity.
There a number of other shortcomings that should be
addressed in future work. As shown earlier, the ROT
string length is constrained drastically by the transmit-
tance, η. In order for ROT to be useful over longer dis-
tances, for instance over a future quantum communica-
tion network covering a city, the impact of loss on security
has to be mitigated. One option could be to analyze the
security proof for the case of an entangled photon source
more carefully since a similar analysis for QKD has found
that entangled systems can tolerate more loss than decoy-
state prepare-and-send systems. Indeed, Wehner et al.
[18] themselves point out they simplified their security
proof for ROT in the case of an entangled source, giving
all information in a double pair (and higher) emission
to Bob. However, not only could the double pair emis-
sion rate be over-estimated in the assumed PDC model,
but as has been pointed out in connection with QKD it
is far from clear that double pair emissions give much,
if anything, to an adversary. In fact the probability of
double pair emission is one of the key quantities limit-
ing the acceptable error rate, transmittance, and overall
ROT rate; thus, there is likely much to be gained from a
more detailed analysis. Another possibility to limit the
impact of loss could be to find a secure version of Kocsis
et al.’s heralded noiseless amplification scheme [38] which
allowed both Alice and Bob to trust its operation.
Smaller issues to make ROT more practical include
relaxing the tolerable error rate in order to use ROT
in a long distance quantum network setting. Even at
short distances with the new min-entropy relation [29]
requiring us to detect as few as 6.65×104 entangled pairs
in approximately ∼2.5 s, the extremely low error rate
required makes it almost impossible to find an efficient
error correction code at this block length.
Lastly, parameter estimation in the ROT protocol is
fundamentally different than in QKD. Here parameters
are estimated before the protocol begins and then the
security statements are evaluated using the agreed upon
experimental parameters. This does not present any se-
curity problems for the reasons outlined in Section “Re-
sults: Experimental Parameters”; however, as a practical
effect if the parameters are poorly estimated then honest
parties will have a difficult time correctly executing the
protocol. Heuristically it seems one would like to esti-
mate the parameters for a long time such that the error
bars on them are smaller than the intervals for Alice’s
security checks. This is not a problem since it only needs
to be done once in advance and will not affect the num-
ber of rounds in the actual ROT protocol. In the case
of devices (e.g. the source) which are not constant but
have relatively slow fluctuations which would increase the
error bars on the parameters during a long estimation,
Alice and Bob could instead intersperse their ROT ex-
periments with new parameter estimations. It is a very
interesting open question for future work whether and
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how one could incorporate the error bars on the param-
eter estimates into the security proof.
In this work, we have shown the first experimental im-
plementation of OT using a modified entangled quan-
tum key distribution system and secured under the noisy-
storage model. We performed an updated security anal-
ysis using a new min-entropy relation including finite
statistics in order to show a drastic improvement in the
secure ROT rate. We also examined the pertinent pa-
rameters which the ROT rate depends on, the most im-
portant being the transmittance and error rate. It will be
very interesting to see whether future work on security
proofs and experimental implementations can make the
protocol even more practical in real-world scenarios.
METHODS
Experimental Implementation
The security proof for ROT guarantees security against
adversaries with quantum memories and a quantum com-
puter; however, the actual implementation of ROT for
honest parties does not require these devices and is pos-
sible with today’s technology [18, 19]. Thus, we modified
our existing entangled QKD system [39, 40] to implement
the first ROT protocol secured under the noisy storage
model. The key difference to keep in mind is that while
loss merely affects the overall key rate in a QKD sys-
tem, in ROT loss is integral to the security of the scheme
and if not properly bounded can prevent any secure ROT
string from being generated.
A schematic of the system is shown in Fig. 3. Entan-
gled photon pairs are produced with a Sagnac interfero-
metric entangled photon source [40–43] consisting of a pe-
riodically poled KTP (PPKTP) non-linear optical crys-
tal produced for a collinear configuration placed in the
middle of an interferometer loop. Entangled photons are
produced by sending 45◦ polarized light at 404 nm onto
a dual wavelength polarizing beamsplitter (dual PBS) at
the apex of the loop, thus bi-directionally pumping the
PPKTP crystal. A dual wavelength half-waveplate (dual
HWP) at 90◦ on one side of the loop properly polar-
izes the pump laser so that the crystal produces down-
converted polarization correlated photons at 808 nm in
both directions around the loop. The dual HWP also
rotates the polarization of the down-converted photons
travelling clockwise around the loop by 90◦ thus ensur-
ing that when the photon pairs are split on the dual PBS
their path information is erased and true polarization en-
tangled photon pairs are generated. The first half of the
entangled photon pairs are collected directly from one
port of the PBS, while the second half of the pairs are
collected via a dichroic mirror responsible for removing
residual photons from the pump laser.
Since the ROT protocol is useful even over very short
distances, such as to securely identify oneself to an ATM
machine over ∼ 30 cm, Alice and Bob each measure their
half of the entangled photon pairs while located next to
the source connected to it with short single-mode optical
fibres. The photons are measured with passive polariza-
tion detector boxes consisting of: a filter to reject back-
ground light, a 50/50 non-polarizing beamsplitter (BS)
to perform the measurement basis choice, a PBS in the
reflected arm of the BS to separate horizontally and ver-
tically polarized photons, and a HWP and PBS in the
transmitted arm of the BS to separate photons polarized
at +45◦ and −45◦. Avalanche photodiode single photon
detectors convert the photons into electronic pulses which
are recorded with time-tagging hardware which saves the
measured polarization and detection time with a pre-
cision of 156.25 ps. The data is transferred to Alice’s
and Bob’s laptops where custom written software then
performs the rest of the ROT protocol including entan-
gled photon pair identification (based on the detection
times), security checking, sifting, error correction, and
2-universal hashing of the final outputs.
While the majority of QKD systems, including ours,
have used an interactive algorithm known as Cascade
[44] for error correction, we are not permitted to use it
in ROT since the interaction would quickly reveal Bob’s
choice bit, C, to Alice. Instead, we chose to implement
one-way forward error correction using low density parity
check (LDPC) codes [45, 46] updated for use in a QKD
system [47–49]. LDPC codes are gaining popularity in
a number of QKD experiments [47, 48] since they can
relieve much of the classical communication bottleneck
that interactive error correction algorithms cause. How-
ever, there is an important difference between one-way
error correction in QKD compared to ROT; namely, in
a QKD protocol error correction is permitted to fail on
a block of key. In this case for QKD, Bob would let Al-
ice know decoding failed on that block and they would
have three options. They could either publicly reveal the
block (in order to maintain an accurate estimate of the
QBER) and then throw it away, they could try another
one-way code optimized for a higher QBER, or they could
revert to a two-way error correction procedure. We are
not permitted to do any of these here as the error correc-
tion failure probability, εEC, is the failure probability for
running error correction on the entire data set generated
during the ROT protocol. A single failure of the error
correction protocol requires Alice and Bob to start the
protocol over.
In our LDPC-based error correction protocol, Al-
ice and Bob share a large parity-check matrix, H,
which is constructed using a modified version of Hu et
al.’s Progressive-Edge Growth (PEG) software [50] with
known optimal degree distribution profiles [51, 52]. Alice
computes syn(X|I0) and syn(X|I1) by treating her two
bit strings as column vectors and applying H to them.
Using the syndromes sent to him from Alice, Bob then
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FIG. 3. Schematic layout of the ROT experiment including all of the coupling losses experienced in the system. The source is
pumped with 7 mW of power.
employs an iterative message passing (or belief propaga-
tion) decoding algorithm known as the sum-product algo-
rithm to correct any errors between his bit string Y |IC
and Alice’s X|IC (where their basis choices matched)
with high probability. Our sum-product LDPC decoder
is written in C# and is based on the Matlab code found
in Ref. [49]. With a block size of N = 600, 000 (matrix
dimensions were 68000×600000) and average row weight
of 40, we achieved an error correction efficiency of 1.491.
Our particularly low source error rate, required to se-
curely implement the protocol, made it very challenging
to find an efficient code and necessitated the large block
sizes. This in turn made decoding particularly time in-
tensive with a single block taking on average 2 min 14 sec.
For the ROT experiment the source was pumped with
7 mW of power as a compromise between a high pair rate
and minimal error rate. Alice and Bob exchanged tim-
ing information in real-time to sort down to coincidence
events. These measurements formed their raw strings (X
and Y respectively) combined with their record of mea-
surement basis for each detection (α and β respectively)
and resulted in raw files 1.17 MB in size. It took Alice
and Bob ∼50 s to measure 1,347,412 coincident detec-
tion events which meant that a total of 8.98 × 107 pairs
(before losses) were distributed by the source. Due to
slightly uneven detection probabilities and the inherent
statistics of the source, Alice and Bob had to measure
for slightly longer than the minimum time necessary to
ensure that they measured 600,000 photon pairs with
matching bases and 600,000 pairs with different bases.
After error correction, Alice and Bob used an LFSR al-
gorithm [24], capable of operating on the entire key at
once, to perform privacy amplification. This is a key re-
quirement to maintain security both in ROT and QKD,
but one that is rarely, if ever, implemented in experimen-
tal and commercial QKD systems. All of the pertinent
figures of merit from performing the ROT protocol are
summarized in Table II.
Figure of Merit Value
total # of pairs created (8.00± 0.06)× 107
# of entangled pairs measured 1,347,412
photon measurement time ∼50 s
∆t 1 sec
size of xˆ|I0 600,000 bits
size of xˆ|I1 600,000 bits
error correction time 2 min 14 sec
size of ROT key 1,366 bits
TABLE II. The pertinent figures of merit generated while
performing the ROT protocol.
Experimental Security Parameters
The security proofs for ROT [18, 19] assumed that the
states emitted by a PDC source can be written as [25]
|Ψsrc〉AB =
∞∑
n=0
√
pnsrc|Φn〉AB (9)
where the probability distribution pnsrc is given by
pnsrc =
(n+ 1)(µ/2)n
(1 + (µ/2))n+2
, (10)
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and the states |Φn〉AB are given by
|Φn〉AB =
n∑
m=0
(−1)m√
n+ 1
|n−m,m〉A|m,n−m〉B . (11)
The states are written here in the basis |H,V 〉 and µ/2
is directly related to the amplitude of the pump laser
resulting in a mean photon pair number per pulse of µ.
Using this assumption and a few other measured param-
eters, the authors of Refs [18, 19] derived all of the other
necessary quantities used in their proofs of security.
Following this prescription, the first thing we calcu-
late is the parameter µ which is slightly more involved
since we have a continuously pumped source which cre-
ates pairs at random times rather than the pulsed source
assumed in the model. Using 7 mW of pump power, we
measure Alice and Bob’s single photon count rates per
second, NA and NB , as well as their coincident detec-
tion rate, Ncoin, measured with a coincidence window of
∆tcoin = 3 ns (see Table III). We then estimate Alice and
Bob’s total transmittances (including their source cou-
pling, polarization analyzer, and detectors) using the for-
mula ηA/B = Ncoin/NB/A [53] which yields ηA = 0.1374
for Alice and ηB = 0.1092 for Bob. Using these numbers
we back out the loss and estimate the total number of
pairs produced at the crystal as 3, 145, 331 pairs/s with
the formula N = NA/ηA. For all count rates Poisso-
nian error bars have been assumed, and Gaussian error
propagation has been applied for the error bars on all
derived quantities. Finally to calculate µ, we define our
pulse length as the coherence time of our laser since the
security statements use µ with Eqs. 9, 10, and 11 to
determine a bound on the possible double pair emission
contributions which might expose additional information
to a dishonest party. It is well known with PDC sources
that pairs separated by more than a coherence time are
independent and thus would not give a dishonest party
additional information. It is only those pairs generated
within the same coherence time which might pose a secu-
rity risk. Thus, with a coherence length of ∆lc = 3 mm
for our laser (iWave-405-S laser specifications, Toptica
Photonics [54]) and a corresponding coherence time of
∆tc = 1.0 × 10−11 s, we can calculate µ using the for-
mula
µ = 3, 145, 331
pairs
s
×∆tc = 3.145× 10−5. (12)
There are three other parameters that are necessary
for the security statements: the total transmittance, η,
which can be calculated from Fig. 3; the intrinsic er-
ror rate (QBER) of the system, edet; and the probabil-
ity of obtaining a dark count in one of Alice’s or Bob’s
detectors, pdark. The dark count probability is defined
similarly to µ (ie. by multiplying the dark count rate
per second by the coherence time), and is taken as the
value of their worst detector. Strictly speaking each de-
tector will have a slightly different detection efficiency
Experimental Parameter Value
NA 432,148 ± 657
NB 343,470 ± 586
Ncoin 47,197 ± 217
ηA 0.1374± 0.0007
ηB 0.1092± 0.0005
N 3,145,182 ± 16,148
TABLE III. Source parameters for ROT where NA and NB
are Alice and Bob’s single photon count rates per second,
Ncoin is their coincident detection rate per second, ηA and
ηB are estimates for Alice and Bob’s total transmittances,
and N is an estimate for the total number of pairs produced
at the crystal per second. The source is pumped with 7 mW
of power, and Poissonian error bars and Gaussian error prop-
agation have been used.
which will provide some partial information to the par-
ties about the strings; however, this information can be
removed by symmetrizing the losses of each user to their
worst detector [20] so that they become independent of
the basis choice. All of these values are summarized in
the top half of Table I.
The security statements (Eqs. 4 – 8) require the follow-
ing important quantities: p1sent, which is the probability
only one photon pair is sent; phB,noclick, which is the prob-
ability that an honest Bob receives no click from a photon
pair in his detector; and pdB,noclick, which is the minimum
probability that a dishonest Bob receives no click from a
photon pair in his detector. All of these are derived from
the PDC model given by Eq. 9 with the experimental
parameters given in Table I. For the derivations we refer
the reader to Ref [18].
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